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George W. Bush’s presidency provides a fertile ground to further develop the standard model of
presidential approval. In contrast to the vast presidential approval literature, early studies of
Bush conclude economic conditions had no effect once the war in Iraq began. Rather than
require a fundamental rethinking of presidential approval theories, we argue that approval
models must take into account issue salience. When a factor is salient, it has a stronger effect.
During the Bush presidency, with considerable over time variation in the salience of the
economy, terrorism, and the war in Iraq, each, in turn, powerfully affected Bush’s approval.
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For better or worse, George W. Bush’s presidency was eventful. The 9/11 terrorist
attacks, military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the beginning of the Great Recession
posed historic and varied challenges to the Bush administration and the nation. Over the eight
years of Bush’s presidency, the public’s major concern moved from domestic issues to terrorism,
shifted to Iraq and then the economy. The percentage of Gallup respondents naming terrorism as
the most important problem facing the nation jumped from less than 1% in the days just prior to
9/11 to 46% in October of 2001, the most in Gallup’s history.1 Over time that percentage waned,
while concern with the economy and Iraq increased. In 2004 the Iraq war became the most
frequently cited problem, a position it held until early 2008, when the economy surpassed Iraq as
the nation’s chief worry.2
Bush’s public standing was as volatile as the events of the day. His presidency exhibited
a highly unusual pattern of support as it recorded the highest post-WWII approval rating in
Gallup polls (90 percent) and just missed having the lowest poll rating as well (25 percent,
compared to 22 percent for Harry Truman).3 Moreover, Bush’s approval was polarized along
partisan lines more than any previous president in the time for which we have polling data
(Jacobson 2006; Newman and Siegle 2010).
The George W. Bush presidency offers an excellent context for evaluating a model of
how individuals evaluate presidential performance. The early evidence suggests that extant
models of presidential approval ratings may be incapable of explaining Bush’s approval. Thus
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http://www.gallup.com/poll/142961/nine-years-few-terrorism-top-problem.aspx
http://www.gallup.com/poll/104464/economy-surpasses-iraq-most-important-problem.aspx
http://www.gallup.com/poll/14314/iraq-economy-remain-most-important-problems.aspx,
http://www.gallup.com/poll/8203/economy-up-iraq-down-most-important-problem.aspx
3
See http://www.gallup.com/poll/116677/Presidential-Approval-Ratings-Gallup-HistoricalStatistics-Trends.aspx accessed March 15, 2014.
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far, some academic studies of George W. Bush’s approval ratings are at odds with 40 years of
approval studies. In their review of the approval literature, Gronke and Newman (2009, 236)
claim that “every study of presidential approval finds economic conditions affect presidential
approval.” However, some studies of George W. Bush’s approval ratings conclude that
economic conditions had no effect on his public approval once the war in Iraq began
(Eichenberg, Stoll, and Lebo 2006; Voeten and Brewer 2006) or had significantly less impact
than earlier presidents (Norpoth and Sidman 2007).
This paper argues that the George W. Bush presidency provides fertile ground to revisit
fundamental questions about the ways in which the public evaluates leaders; especially the
economy/approval relationship. In a review of the approval literature, Gronke and Newman
(2009) argue that historically the economy is one of the main drivers of approval. It could be the
case that Bush’s presidency was simply different from previous presidencies. Alternatively, it
may be that models of presidential approval were never all that clear on the economy’s impact to
begin with. As a recent review (Berlemann and Enkelmann 2014, 42) argues: “evidence on
economic determinants [of presidential approval] is surprisingly inconsistent and fragmentary.”
Based on their review of 57 studies, along with their own empirical analyses, they conclude that
“the effects of economic variables on approval are far from being as clear-cut as some…papers
suggest” (43). Along the same lines, in their influential review, Nannestad and Paldam (1994,
214) concluded that the relationship between the economy and electoral outcomes and the
popularity of leaders “suffers from the predicament of instability,” suggesting that the economy’s
effect on politics varies significantly over time.
A key question is: Why does the economy’s impact on approval vary from president to
president? We believe the answer to the question lies in the shifting salience of key
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environmental factors. From a theoretical standpoint, some studies have highlighted the role of
salience in presidential evaluations. Several of them have shown that the impact of the economy,
major events, and war depends on their salience, at least in the short term (e.g., Iyengar and
Kinder 1987; Kinder and Krosnick 1990; Krosnick and Brannon 1993; Edwards, Mitchell, and
Welch 1995; Miller and Krosnick 2000). However, despite significant individual-level support
for this idea in the short term, few longer-term aggregate-level time series analyses have
incorporated it. Thus, while we have theoretical reasons to believe that big shifts in salience like
those seen in the Bush administration would lead to changes in the impact of key indicators on
aggregate approval ratings, there are limited aggregate-level empirical tests of this expectation.4
This paper examines whether taking salience into account helps explain and understand the
volatile path of Bush’s approval ratings.
Understanding Bush’s approval ratings is important for three reasons. First, we can test
the salience hypothesis in a new context. Extant analyses of salience’s impact on presidential
approval mainly focused on individual-level experiments or presidents in office at least two
decades ago. Second, we shed light on the relationship between the economy and presidential
evaluations. Studies of the Bush presidency thus far suggest that Bush’s approval ratings “broke
the rules.” We assess whether and how this might be. Not only will such an assessment help us
understand Bush’s approval ratings, sorting out the economy’s impact on Bush’s approval
ratings also contributes to the larger literature on the economy’s political consequences,
especially the economic voting literature (see Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2013 for a review of
this vast literature). Just as studies of economic voting have explored variation in the links

4

Those that do covered earlier presidencies—Eisenhower through Reagan (Ostrom and Simon
1985) and George H. W. Bush (Edwards, et al. 1995).
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between the economy and voting behavior, we examine whether and how the economy shaped
Bush’s approval and the ways those effects varied over time.
Third, understanding Bush’s approval more broadly is important simply because
presidential approval ratings shape a wide range of political phenomena. Approval ratings alter
presidents’ policy proposals (Canes-Wrone and Shotts 2004; Canes-Wrone 2005), public
statements about issues (Eshbaugh-Soha and Rottinghaus 2013) and use of unilateral powers
(Rottinghaus and Warber 2015). Higher approval ratings are at least sometimes related to
presidents’ success in Congress (Canes-Wrone and de Marchi 2002; see Edwards 2009 for a
review) and the president’s party is more successful in congressional, gubernatorial, and state
legislative elections when presidential approval is higher (Newman and Ostrom 2002; Simon,
Ostrom, and Marra 1991). Moreover, presidential (dis)approval has been strongly related to the
way people vote from 1952 to 2012 (Abramson, et al. 2015) and even how people view previous
presidents (Panagopoulos 2012).
We find that taking salience into account makes sense both of George W. Bush’s
approval ratings and, more generally, of the overtime variation in the economy/approval
relationship. In particular, once tradeoffs in the salience of peace, prosperity, and security are
accounted for, we find that Bush, even though the war dominated his approval ratings, his ratings
were also significantly affected by terrorism and the economy in predictable ways.

THE ROLE OF SALIENCE IN PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL
In his seminal work, Presidential Power, Neustadt (1980, 70, emphasis added)
persuasively argues there is an experiential base undergirding citizen evaluations of the
president:
What a president should be is something most people will see by light of what is
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happening to them. Their notions of the part a president should play, their satisfaction
with the way he plays it, are affected by their private hopes and fears. Behind their
judgments of performance lie the consequences in their lives.

The Environmental Connection
The vast literature on presidential approval has largely validated Neustadt’s basic point
that there is a connection between the political and economic environment and the public’s
assessment of presidential performance. This work has pointed to three main factors that shape
the dynamics of aggregate approval: peace, prosperity, and security. Rather than review the
entirety of this literature, we briefly summarize some highlights (see Gronke and Newman 2003,
2009 for extended reviews). First, several studies have found peace and war to affect presidents’
approval in profound ways. Mueller’s (1973) path breaking analysis of approval was part of a
book entitled War, Presidents, and Public Opinion. Since his study, many have confirmed that
protracted wars drag approval down, especially as battle deaths sustained by the U.S. military
increase (e.g., Kernell 1978; Ostrom and Simon 1985; see also Gartner and Segura 1998).
Second, many studies have demonstrated economic effects on presidential approval.
Some focus on objective economic conditions (e.g., Mueller 1973; Kernell 1978; Ostrom and
Simon 1985; Newman 2002) while others show the robust effects perceptions of the economy
exert on approval (e.g., MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson 1992; Clarke and Stewart 1994;
Norpoth 1996). The bottom line is economic variables of some sort are staples of presidential
approval models. Although the economy-approval relationship has long been documented,
Berlemann and Enkelmann’s recent review points to many unsettled questions. In particular, they
find inconsistencies in economic effects across studies of different time periods, concluding that
“the underlying relationship between presidential popularity and economic variables is changing
in the course of time” (Berlemann and Enkelmann 2014, 43). Moreover, they conclude their
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exhaustive review of the impact of the economy by arguing that “further research on the stability
of the popularity function in the course of time seems to be urgently necessary” (2014, 52).
Along the same lines, in their influential review, Nannestad and Paldam (1994, 214) concluded
that the relationship between the economy and electoral outcomes and the popularity of leaders
“suffers from the predicament of instability,” suggesting that the economy’s effect on politics
varies significantly over time.
Third, security refers to the elemental type of security imagined by Maslow (1943):
security of body. Over the past century, the US has been attacked on its home soil a small
number of times (e.g., Pearl Harbor, World Trade Center, and 9/11). Many have argued that after
9/11 the US entered an “age of terror” (Talbott and Chanda 2002; Merolla and Zechmeister
2009), suggesting the attack created a long-term shock to Americans’ sense of security.
Perceived threats to security often lead to boosts in approval, a phenomenon often called the
“rally ‘round the flag” effect.
Virtually every study of approval finds dramatic events affect aggregate approval (e.g.,
Mueller 1973; MacKuen 1983; Ostrom and Simon 1985; Newman and Forcehimes 2010).
Extraordinary events, which can have a positive or negative effect, capture the public’s attention
(Ostrom and Simon 1985, 364; MacKuen 1983, 189-90) and tap deeply held beliefs about
presidential authority (Ostrom and Smith 1992, 130). These are highly salient events that directly
relate to presidents. Therefore, such events affect presidential approval. Since we assume the
public holds stable preferences for peace, prosperity, and security, we focus on extraordinary
events related to these outcomes, as noted below. In addition, we refer to an additional and more
frequently occurring class of events that we will refer to as ordinary political events, which can
also boost or depress approval ratings briefly (MacKuen 1983; Newman and Forcehimes 2010).
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To summarize, the literature has more or less uniformly concluded that these three factors
shape approval dynamics over time. As Ostrom and Simon (1985, 336) put it, “all presidents are
expected to maintain peace, prosperity, [and] domestic tranquility . . . regardless of the
president’s stated philosophy, party identification, or prior experience . . . it is believed that the
office provides any president with the necessary means to ensure that these desirable conditions
are maintained.” Yet, the question of how to explain variations in the effect of each of these
three factors has not been fully addressed.

The War President: The George W. Bush Literature
Studies of George W. Bush’s presidency suggest we may need to rethink this view of
public evaluations. We know of seven studies with in-depth aggregate-level time series analyses
of the causes of George W. Bush’s aggregate approval ratings (Eichenberg, et al. 2006; Fox
2009, 2012; Gelpi, et al. 2005/06; Geys 2010; Norpoth and Sidman 2007; Voeten and Brewer
2006). Appendix A provides a detailed comparison of the studies. As a group, these studies are
methodologically sophisticated, often marshalling more nuanced weekly data than ever before
(extant work relies on monthly or quarterly data) and employing various time series modeling
strategies. These methods have generated significant substantive conclusions important for our
understanding of both George W. Bush’s presidency and presidential approval ratings generally.
In particular, some studies found that, at least at times, the economy did not affect George W.
Bush’s approval. This finding is a huge departure from earlier work. As Eichenberg, et al. (2006,
802) put it, “particularly striking is the fact that no study [at that time] has found that economic
performance has been a major influence on Bush approval, findings that are in stark contrast to
the existing literature.” They conclude, “that Bush has, to a large extent, been a ‘war
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president’—his approval rating was not affected by economic performance after the war in Iraq
began” (748). Along the same lines, Voeten and Brewer (2006, 827) conclude that consumer
confidence “effects were not significant at conventional levels.”
In contrast, some studies document economic effects. Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler
(2005/06, 22-23) conclude “the DJIA [Dow Jones Industrial Average] does have a statistically
significant and substantively important impact on presidential approval.” Norpoth and Sidman
(2007) found that consumer sentiment significantly affected Bush’s approval during his first
term, though the economy had a significantly smaller effect for Bush’s approval than it had for
previous presidents. Fox (2009) found that inflation and unemployment were significantly
related to Bush’s approval. Fox (2012) found these same economic variables had a statistically
significant effect on approval during the period covering the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq
(March 2001 to December 2010, including the first two years of the Obama presidency). Geys
(2010) examined the entire 1948 to 2008 period and found GDP, unemployment, and inflation to
be significant predictors of approval, along with the financial costs of the war.
Thus, taken together, the presidential approval and economic voting literatures suggest
that the economy’s political effects vary. Along the same lines, the extant literature on Bush’s
approval ratings generates inconsistent results. At this point, the Bush literature cannot provide a
definitive picture of the economy-approval relationship, partly because the seven studies each
employ unique measures and methods to examine different time periods. Although each study
handles several thorny methodological issues in defensible ways, there are many points on which
the studies diverge. Consequently, the Bush studies do not yet provide a cumulative body
pointing to strong and consistent conclusions about the role of the economy. They may be,
however, understandable through the lens of shifting salience.
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The Importance of Salience
We argue that taking account of salience can help make sense of mixed results and the
unstable relationship between the economy and evaluations of leaders. Neustadt (1980, 72)
argued that “one should never underestimate the public’s power to ignore.” Since his writing,
public opinion and political psychology studies have found that most individuals in the public
tend to focus their attention on relatively few highly salient elements of the political and
economic context when evaluating leaders. Rather than gathering and using information on all
aspects of the environment, most individuals rely on information they deem most important at
the time, judgments that are strongly shaped by mass media and elite discourse (e.g., Iyengar and
Kinder 1987; Krosnick and Kinder 1990; Krosnick and Brannon 1993; Miller and Krosnick
2000). The extent of the public’s focus on peace, prosperity, and security, vary over time; the
impact of these outcomes on approval varies with salience (Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Ostrom
and Simon 1988; Edwards 1990; Krosnick and Brannon 1993; Edwards, Mitchell, and Welch
1995; Miller and Krosnick 2000; Druckman and Holmes 2004). Edwards, Mitchell, and Welch
(1995, 110) note that “issues vary in salience to the public over time” and go on to observe (110)
“understanding presidential approval, then, requires identifying not only what issues Americans
think about but also gauging the degree of salience Americans place on these issues. One cannot
assume that people always judge the president by the same benchmarks.”
Examining the degree to which the impact of peace, prosperity, and security vary with
changes in salience makes contributions to both our broader theoretical understanding of
approval and our thinking about the George W. Bush presidency. Although scholars have argued
for some time that outcomes and conditions exert greater impact on evaluations of presidents
when they are more salient, to date few studies have examined the extent to which this occurs in
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an aggregate time series context (Ostrom and Simon 1985; Edwards, et al. 1995; see also
McAvoy 2006). Studies that have examined salience’s role in a time series context have not
included the Bush presidency. Ostrom and Simon’s (1985) analysis stopped with the first two
years of the Reagan administration. Edwards, et al. (1995) examined 25 polls over most of the
George H. W. Bush presidency, while McAvoy’s (2006) study included the first two years of the
George W. Bush presidency. The dramatic changes in salience over the George W. Bush
presidency, along with a wealth of data provide a novel and rich context for examining the role
of salience in approval.

OPERATIONALIZING THE MODEL
Dependent Variable
Presidential approval is measured using data from the Gallup poll.5 During the period
from January 2001 to December 2008, Gallup included the question “Do you approve or
disapprove of the way George W. Bush is handling his job as president?” in 282 surveys over the
eight years (or approximately 3 times per month). Since many of the environmental indicators
are reported monthly, we created a monthly approval variable that averages all polls in the field
at least one day during the month.6 Figure 1 displays the average monthly percentage of
Americans who approved of the job that Bush was doing during his presidency. Table 1
describes all variables we use.

5 (http://www.gallup.com/poll/116500/presidential-approval-ratings-george-bush.aspx),

accessed

March 15, 2014.
6 For example, in October 2008 there were four polls (10/3-5, 10/10-12, 10/23-26, 10/31-11/2)
that included the presidential approval question while in November 2008 there were three polls
(10/31-11/2, 11/7-9, 11/13-16). The 10/31-11/2 poll was used to calculate the monthly average
approval rating in both October and November.
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[Figure 1 about here]
[Table 1 about here]
Environmental Indicators
Our discussion of the “environmental connection” guides the identification of the key
indicators that impinge on presidential approval: prosperity, peace, and security.
Economy (Prosperity). As noted previously, prior research has used a variety of
economic measures and as of now there is no consensus as to what measure is most appropriate
(see Berlemann and Enkelmann 2014). We have chosen to look at different types of measures.
First, we utilize inflation and unemployment because they are the most frequently discussed
economic indicators in the media across all outlets. These two measures are presumably the two
that most people are familiar with and hence the two the public is most likely to pay attention to.
Second, we use a measure of consumer confidence.7 Whereas inflation and unemployment are
indicative of economic problems, consumer confidence provides a measure that is sensitive to
economic optimism.
Battle Deaths (Peace). Following prior investigations, we make use of the number of
battle deaths as the most fundamental outcome related to peace. The number of troops killed in
action serves as a clear indicator of both the magnitude and intensity of a war as well as the
collective pain inflicted on society (Eichenberg, et al. 2006; Gelpi, et al. 2005/06; Ostrom and
Simon 1985). The magnitude of war is measured by the base 10 logarithm of the cumulative sum
of US troops killed in Afghanistan and Iraq. The sum is included to capture the notion that
people react to the cumulative effects of war (Mueller 1973). The use of the logarithm

7 Specifically,

we use the Conference Board's Consumer Confidence Index (1985=100); available
at http://future.aae.wisc.edu/data/monthly_values .
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acknowledges that, over the course of a war, the public is “sensitive to relatively small losses in
the early stages but only large losses in later stages” (Mueller 1973: 62).8
9/11 (Security). The terrorist attacks, the most deadly attack on U.S. soil since Pearl
Harbor, created a long-term shock that undermined the sense of elemental security. Evidence
suggests that in the public mind, the US entered an “age of terror” in the aftermath of the 9/11
attacks (Talbott and Chanda, 2002; Merolla and Zechmeister 2009). We modeled this change as
an equilibrium shock taking on the value of 0 prior to 9/11 and 1 thereafter (see Ostrom and
Smith 1992: 133).

Dramatic Political Events
As noted earlier, both extraordinary and ordinary events may influence presidential
approval.
Extraordinary Political Events. Three dramatic political events occurred during Bush’s
presidency; one associated with each of the major environmental indicators. The three variables
focus on 9/11 (September 2001 through May 2005), Invasion of Iraq (March 2003 through
August 2003)9, and Stock Market “Correction” (September 2008 through end of term).
Ordinary Political Events. We utilized Newman and Forcehimes’ (2010) list of
suggested events.10 Since their list only goes through 2006, it was updated for 2007 and 2008;
this results in the addition of the Surge in Iraq. After extracting the three extraordinary events,

8

This measure is consistent with prior research on Iraq (Eichenberg, et al, 2006) and relies on
basic battle death data from http://icasualties.org/Iraq/Index.aspx.
9 In principle, one might want to include the invasion of Afghanistan. However, given its
relatively small size, limited duration (at least in terms of the initial battle against the Taliban in
power), and the fact that it overlapped with the response to 9/11, we have chosen not to do so.
10 Their selection criteria for events meshes nicely with our theoretical setup. They include events
that were covered for at least three days on the front page of the New York Times.
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the resulting 14 ordinary political events are presented in the appendix (Table B). We took one
additional step, suggested by Newman (2002) and placed the 14 events into four subsets:
Domestic (positive/negative) and International (positive/negative).
Salience
Salience is measured using Gallup’s standard Most Important Problem (MIP) question
(What is the most important problem facing the country today?). The MIP question is openended in the sense that people are not restricted to a single response. Each of the individual MIP
surveys has over 30 unique responses. We collapsed responses into several categories. For
example, the economy as most important problem will include the following responses:
“unemployment/jobs” and “High cost of living/inflation.” The salience of security was based on
those responding with “Terrorism”. While the salience of war was measured by those responding
with a mention of “War”, there is a suggestion that the primary response was “Fear of War” prior
to November 2004 and “Situation in Iraq/War” thereafter.11
Many studies have employed the MIP item as a measure of salience (Young and Perkins
2005; McAvoy 2006; Hetherington and Rudolph 2008; Jones, Larsen-Price, and Wilkerson
2009; Jennings and John 2009; Smidt 2012) while some have argued against it. In terms of
presidential approval studies, Edwards, et al. (1995, 115) point to two drawbacks of the measure.

11 The

Gallup MIP data provides a changing set of response codes related to War in this time
period. From 1/01 to 3/03 the responses were coded: “Fear of War/Feelings of Fear in this
country.” Beginning in April of 2003 (until 4/04, the responses were coded: “Fear of
war/feelings of fear in this country/war in Iraq”. From May 2004 until 10/2004, the responses
were coded: “War in Iraq/fear of war/feelings of fear in this country.” Finally, beginning in
November 2004, there was a new category: “Situation in Iraq/war.” In our judgment, it is the
last categorization that indicates the presence of a significant specific problem for the Bush
Administration. Results are similar if we include earlier categories or just the responses starting
in November of 2004. Consequently, there is no significant empirical impact of battle deaths on
approval prior to November 2004.
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First, they note “the question is not asked regularly enough to be useful in our analysis.” While
this first objection was germane at the time of the study, the MIP question was asked in 90 of the
96 months George W. Bush was in office. Second, the authors (116) raise the issue of whether
most important problem responses are “equivalent” to salience in that identifying something as a
problem is not the same as saying it is salient (see also Wlezien 2005). 12 Our conception of
salience is that the public pays attention to each environmental indicator in proportion to the time
it draws their notice; this, in turn, is directly tied to the extent the factor is perceived as a
problem. Following this logic, the most important problem data is a good measure of salience for
our purposes.
Figure 2 presents the salience values over the course of George W. Bush’s
administration. Salience shifts considerably over the course of the Bush presidency. In fact,
security, peace, and prosperity were each the most important problem during some part of the
eight years. Generally, as one factor became more prominent, the other two factors appear to
have receded somewhat. We weight the peace, prosperity, and security, variables by their
salience in each month as noted in Table 1.
[Figure 2 about here]

12 Wlezien

(2005) also raises the possibility that the MIP measure may conflate two different
characteristics of salience: the importance of the issue versus the degree to which an issue is a
problem. He raises the possibility that issues and problems are fundamentally different things—
one relating to public policy and the other to actual conditions. In the context of our analysis, we
are comfortable making the connection with conditions (and we already know they are
important) – these are things the public feels the president should be paying attention to.
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Basic Model Specification and Estimation
Prior to presenting the results, we consider two statistical issues frequently present in
approval analyses. There is a long history of dealing with the statistical problems of serial
correlation (e.g., Hibbs 1973) and heteroskedasticity (e.g., Gronke and Brehm 2002) in models
of presidential approval. These are important problems because they lead to overconfidence in
the results. In the face of the likelihood of serial correlation and heteroskedasticity, we follow
Achen (2000) and Keele and Kelly’s (2005) advice and employed the Newey-West Estimator
(Newey and West 1987) which provides a HAC (heteroskedasticity/autocorrelation consistent)
estimator. The general treatment of standard errors that are both heteroskedasticity and serial
correlation robust can be found in Davidson and MacKinnon (1989).13 We follow Wooldridge
(2012) to derive heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) covariance matrix
estimator. 14
To test our findings’ robustness we also estimated models using the two most commonly
employed methods in earlier Bush studies, namely including a lagged dependent variable, a
common estimation strategy employed in presidential approval studies (e.g., Kernell 1978;
MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson 1992; Fox 2009, 2012; Geys 2010) and error correction models
(e.g., Beck 1992; Ostrom and Simon 1992; Eichenberg, et al. 2006; Voeten and Brewer 2006; for
a comprehensive review of error correction models in political science, see Grant and Lebo
2015). We find consistent results across approaches.

13

Using the Newey-West approach, we are able to deal with the twin problems of serial
correlation and heteroskedasticity without distorting the coefficient estimates (as would happen
with FGLS-type methods).
14 Based upon our sample size of 96, we followed the Newey-West suggestion and use 6 lags for
the structure of the autocorrelation.
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EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Table 2 presents the Newey-West estimates with robust standard errors (column 1), and
the estimates of a lagged approval model (column 2). In general, the models fit the data well.15
Of most importance, we find that the categories of enduring environmental indicators and
extraordinary political events are highly significant in the predicted direction in each model.
[Table 2 about here]
Turning first to the impact of the economy, the coefficients for the unemployment,
inflation and consumer confidence as well as the Stock Market Crash are statistically significant
(p < .01) in the predicted direction in both models. With respect to war, the invasion of Iraq led
to a substantial increase of over 8 points in the approval of George W. Bush in the Newey-West
model and 5 points in the lagged dependent variable model, while weighted battle deaths
significantly decreased approval in both models.16 Finally, the security issues captured by
Security and 9/11 indicate statistically significant results in the predicted direction for both
models. All in all, there is strong support for the enduring matters-of-life first suggested by
Neustadt. There is mixed support, however, for the ordinary political events as can be seen in
Table 2. Both Positive Domestic and Positive International events consistently boost approval
across the models, but the negative events were not statistically significant in either model.

15 For

example, correlating the predicted values from the regression in column 1 with the actual
values of approval indicates that the model accounts for over 96% of the variation in Bush
approval with an RMSE of 3.16.
16
We recognize that utilizing the logarithm of the cumulative casualties, in spite of the fact that
it has been used widely in the literature, may raise some concerns. We did a separate run of the
model using weighted monthly casualties. The weighted monthly casualty variable was
statistically significant and with one exception (international events) the remaining coefficients
are unchanged
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We present results from error correction models (ECMs) in Table 3. The lagged and
differenced variables in this model make it unwieldy to present in the same table as the NeweyWest and lagged dependent variable models. We focus for now only on column 1, which
provides a very similar picture to the results in Table 2. All of the economic variables achieve
statistical significance at the .05 level, suggesting that the economy has both short- and long-term
effects on approval. The same is true for the battle deaths. The Security variables and the 9/11
attacks were also statistically significant. As above, the positive events were significantly related
to Bush’s approval, but not the negative events.17 We also note that taking fractional integration
into account provided similar results.18
[Table 3 about here]

Explanatory Implications
All in all, the results discussed so far provide a high level of statistical support for the

17 Eichenberg,

et al. (2006) and Voeten and Brewer (2006) specify an error correction model in
which only casualties were specified as having short- and long-term effects. We estimated an
error correction model in which only battle deaths were allowed to have short-and long-term
effects. We continued to find statistically significant effects for all of the economic variables,
security variables, and war variables.
18 For discussions of fractional integration, in which a series is not generated by a unit-root
process, but is also not perfectly stationary (and is therefore “long-memoried”), see BoxSteffensmeier and Smith (1996, 1998), Lebo and Clarke (2000), Grant and Lebo (2015). We
followed the three-step procedure described in Grant and Lebo (2015, 25-27) and implemented
in Clarke and Lebo (2003). We first estimated a model of approval as a function of the economic
variables, battle deaths, and security. We took the residuals as the error correction mechanism.
Next, we used Robinson’s (1995) estimator of the level of fractional integration in approval, the
economic variables, battle deaths, and the error correction mechanism. Finding each to be above
0.5, we fractionally differenced each (including the error correction mechanism). Finally, we
estimated a model using these fractionally differenced variables along with our other variables.
Results are difficult to interpret substantively (see Grant and Lebo 2015, 27), but we continued to
find economic effects, with p-values for consumer confidence of .06 and unemployment coming
close to statistical significance at p = .14 (both two-tailed tests).
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notion that once we take salience into account, peace, prosperity, and security shaped Bush’s
approval. To get an idea of the impact of the three sets of environmental factors and the
extraordinary political events, we created three composite variables from the first model in Table
2 using the following equations [nb. The variable notations can be found in Table 1]:
𝑊𝑎𝑟 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡 = 𝑏4 𝑋4𝑡 + 𝑏7 𝑋7𝑡 = −20.94 ∗ 𝑋4𝑡 + 8.39 ∗ 𝑋7𝑡
𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡 = 𝑏5 𝑋5𝑡 + 𝑏6 𝑋6𝑡 = . 48 ∗ 𝑋5𝑡 + 14.24 ∗ 𝑋6𝑡
𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡 = 𝑏1 𝑋1𝑡 + 𝑏2 𝑋2𝑡 + 𝑏3 𝑋3𝑡 + 𝑏8 𝑋8𝑡
= −.28 ∗ 𝑋1𝑡 − .51 ∗ 𝑋2𝑡 + 1.85 ∗ 𝑋3𝑡 − 9.78 ∗ 𝑋8𝑡

The specific coefficient values are taken from Table 2 (Column 1) and when multiplied by the
actual values of the variables, one obtains the estimated impact of each matter-of-life concern
over the 96 months. Figure 3 provides a graphical representation of the impact of these three
composite variables over the course of the George W. Bush presidency.
[Figure 3 about here]
Figure 3 points to a number of conclusions concerning the model’s substantive
implications. First, with respect to the war in Iraq, it is clear that the invasion created an initial
rally that gradually eroded as battle deaths mounted. As it became clear to the public that the Iraq
war was not likely to end soon, battle deaths eroded Bush’s approval. The overall impact of the
war was substantial and ranged from +8 to -28 points holding all else equal. The negative impact
peaked in February 2007; at that point attention gradually turned toward the economy and the
negative impact of the war on approval dropped to an estimated impact of -7 in December 2012.
Although it is clear the war had a significant and enduring negative impact on Bush’s approval
ratings, these results raise questions about whether George W. Bush’s approval decline was
solely due to the war in Iraq.
Turning to the consequences of the 9/11 attack on security concerns, we find a significant
and substantial influence on Bush’s approval ratings. The impact of security ranged from 0 to
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+36 holding all else equal. As time passed and the Iraq War began to dominate, the focus on
security and the possibility of another terror attack dropped. By November 2002 the estimated
residual positive impact of the security issue was less than 10 points. All in all, the graphic
portrayal of the 9/11 attacks and its ushering in of an “age of terror” seems eminently plausible.
The economy had a statistically significant and persistent impact on the president’s
approval ratings ranging from +4 to -13 over the course of the tenure of George W. Bush. The
impact of the economy was persistent but it did not compare – for most of the term – to the
impact of security and the Iraq War. However, by mid-2008, the negative impact of the economy
approached that of the war and it surpassed it in the last four months of the Bush presidency. At
the time of the 2008 Stock Market Crash, approval decreased by over 13 rating points due to
economic issues. To conclude, as some previous research has done, that the economy did not
matter is to overstate the impact of the war. The economy mattered and, as economic conditions
worsened, it began to matter more than any other environmental concern.
Taken together, the three sets of environmental factors – peace, security, and prosperity –
exerted a persistent but changing impact on approval. While there is no doubt that the war in Iraq
and the 9/11 terror attack had a strong impact on approval, our results underscore the fact that the
economy did play an important role throughout the George W. Bush presidency, frequently
boosting his approval by 3 to 5 points and then coming to prominence in his final months in
office when it cost Bush up to almost 20 points. The role of changing salience is clear. It is also
worth noting that even if a problem persists (e.g., war in Iraq), the public may turn its attention
away from the war toward a problem it finds more pressing (e.g., economy). In the context of the
Bush presidency the relative impact of peace, prosperity, and security differed: each was most
influential at one point during Bush’s presidency.
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What Difference does Salience Make?
To get a sense of the importance of salience, we employ two different approaches. First,
to see the extent of the impact of salience, we allowed each environmental variable to move from
one standard deviation below its mean to one standard deviation above its mean and then varied
the salience from the 10th percentile to the 90th percentile. Table 4 provides the results of this
analysis. To clarify the information in Table 4, let’s look at inflation. In the first column, when
salience is at the 10th percentile, approval changes (using the coefficient from Table 2) by -1.08
points as inflation moves from one standard deviation below its mean to one standard deviation
above. In the second column, when salience is at the 90th percentile, approval changes (using the
coefficient from Table 2) by -3.23 points as inflation moves from one standard deviation below
its mean to one standard deviation above. The impact of high salience is 3 times the impact of
low salience for similar changes in the inflation variable. As can be seen in Table 4, the
remaining environmental variables have even larger impacts with such variation. Salience either
attenuates or amplifies the impact between changes in the environment and changes approval.
[Table 4 about here]
Second, we compare our models in Table 2 to models in Table 5 that exclude salience.
When excluding salience, economic conditions have substantively implausible effects. The war
and security variables perform as expected, but of the economic variables, only consumer
confidence has the expected sign and significance. Unemployment and inflation are estimated to
have a positive impact on approval, with unemployment reaching statistical significance. That is,
the model implausibly suggests that as unemployment rises, approval rises as well.
[Table 5 about here]
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We find similar results in the error correction models (see Table 3, column 2). In this
framework, battle deaths have a long-run relationship with approval, but no short-term effects.
Security has a short-term, but no long-term effect. More importantly, the economic effects are
unexpected. Inflation has no estimated effect, while high unemployment again has a positive
effect on approval in the long-run. Consumer confidence has no short-run effect, but does have
the expected long-run effect on approval. Even though statistical fit is similar between models
taking salience into account and those that ignore it, there are serious plausibility concerns with
the estimated economic parameters in models without salience.

CONCLUSIONS
This paper is motivated by an examination of two questions: (1) Why did the economy
play a less prominent role in the George W. Bush presidency? and more generally, (2) Why
might we expect the relationship between the economy and approval to change from presidency
to presidency? We base our answers to these questions on the premise that it is important to take
issue salience explicitly into account when modeling the impact of environmental factors on
presidential approval.
With respect to the first question, we incorporate salience into a time series model of
George W. Bush’s approval ratings. This suggestion has not been explored often in the
aggregate time series framework and certainly not in the George W. Bush presidency. In doing
so, we argue that the impact of environmental factors (including war, economy) should vary with
the relative salience of the economy over the course of each president’s tenure in office. When
we incorporate salience into a model of Bush’s aggregate approval, we find that the factors
shown to affect approval for previous presidents, namely peace, prosperity, and security, also
account for Bush’s approval.
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With respect to the second question, our approach may help make sense of conflicting
results in the vast literatures studying the political consequences of the economy. Reviews of the
presidential approval (Berlemann and Enkelmann 2014) and economic voting literatures
(Nannestad and Paldam 1994) have pointed to instability in the political impact of the economy.
Over time variation in salience may well explain the varying effects of the economy. A more
recent review of the economic voting literature (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2013) argues that the
unstable relationship between the economy and electoral outcomes can be explained by taking
other political factors into account. Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (381) concludes that the
“changing weights for the economic vote merely reflect the choices a reasoning voter makes.”
Our results point to the same conclusion in the realm of the perpetual election of presidential
approval polls.
Taken together, our answers to these two questions shed new light on the approval
dynamics of the Bush presidency. Presidential approval connects to a wide range of political
actions and outcomes in the U.S., as noted in the introduction. Our results suggest that efforts to
understand and explain American politics during the tumultuous George W. Bush presidency
must consider not only terrorism and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, but also the economy
especially when filtered through the lens of salience.
In doing so, our results support the salience hypothesis. Changes in salience have long
been shown to alter the foundations of public support for the president over short time periods
(e.g., Krosnick and Kinder 1990). We show that changes in salience have systematic effects over
the course of Bush’s two-term presidency. Moreover, our results show how failing to take
salience into account can lead to incorrect substantive conclusions. The results in Table 5, which
ignore salience, implausibly suggest that Bush’s approval ratings went up as employment rose,
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even controlling for other factors that might account for this strange result. Where some studies
concluded that the economy had no effect after the war began, our results show significant
economic effects, especially as the salience of the economy increased.
Finally, our results support a durable model of approval. Once we allow the impact of the
environmental factors to vary by salience, Bush’s approval, historic on many counts (e.g.,
biggest rally, longest rally, most polarized at the time, most variable), fits nicely within the long
literature on approval. At least during the George W. Bush presidency, it appears the impact of
various evaluative criteria changes over time in what appear to be relatively reasonable ways.
Future research should examine whether this view can explain the apparent instability of
approval models over a greater length of time beyond just eight years of the Bush administration.
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TABLES –
Table 1: Variable Definitions and Data Sources
Name
Dependent Variable
At
Approval

Measurement

Data Source

Average Monthly
http://www.gallup.com/poll/116500/presidentia
Approval
l-approval-ratings-george-bush.aspx
Environmental Variables (weighted by salience)
X1t Unemploymen Unemployment rate * http://www.miseryindex.us/
t
W1t
X2t Inflation
Inflation rate* W2t
http://www.miseryindex.us/
X3t Consumer
Consumer
http://future.aae.wisc.edu/data/monthly_values
Confidence
Confidence index*
(W1t + W2t)
X4t Battle Deaths
Log10 Cumulative
http://icasualties.org/Iraq/Index.aspx
Battle Deaths * W3t
X5t Security
0 from 1/2001 thru
8/2001; 1 from 9/11
on * W4t
Extraordinary Events
X6t 9/11 Attack
1 from 9/2001 thru
=1 if covered for at least twenty days in a
2/2002; 0 otherwise
month on the front page of the New York Times
X7t Iraq Invasion
1 from 4/2003 thru
=1 if covered for at least twenty days in a
8/2003; 0 otherwise
month on the front page of the New York Times
X8t Market Crash 1 from 9/2008 to
=1 if covered for at least twenty days in a
12/2008; 0 otherwise month on the front page of the New York Times
Ordinary Events
X9t Positive
See Table B – coded Events that were covered for at least three days
International
1 in all months with
on the front page of the New York Times
“3+ days coverage”;
0 otherwise
X10 Positive
See Table B – coded Events that were covered for at least three days
Domestic
1 in all months with
on the front page of the New York Times
t
“3+ days coverage”;
0 otherwise
X11 Negative
See Table B – coded Events that were covered for at least three days
International
1 in all months with
on the front page of the New York Times
t
“3+ days coverage”;
0 otherwise
X12 Negative
See Table B – coded Events that were covered for at least three days
Domestic
1 in all months with
on the front page of the New York Times
t
“3+ days coverage”;
0 otherwise
Salience Weights
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W1t Unemploymen
t MIP
W2t Inflation MIP
W3t War MIP
W4t Terror MIP

“Unemployment/jobs
”
“High cost of
living/inflation.”
“Situation in
Iraq/War”
“Terrorism”

Monthly Gallup Polls
Monthly Gallup Polls
Monthly Gallup Polls
Monthly Gallup Polls
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Table 2: Approval Model with Salience

Weighted Inflation
Weighted Unemployment
Weighted Consumer Confidence
Weighted Battle Deaths

NeweyWest

Lagged
Approval

-0.51

-0.31

(0.06)**

(0.08)**

-0.28

-0.19

(0.05)**

(0.05)**

1.85

1.24

(0.30)**

(0.33)**

-20.94
(0.84)**

Weighted Security
9/11 Attack

Market Crash
Positive Domestic
Positive International
Negative Domestic
Negative International

(1.98)**

0.48

0.27

(0.09)**

(0.07)**

14.24
(3.10)**

Iraq Invasion

-12.97

10.74
(1.57)**

8.39

5.33

(1.37)**

(1.70)**

-9.78

-5.93

(1.72)**

(2.15)**

3.71

2.87

(1.32)**

(1.07)**

3.68

2.06

(1.03)**

(1.06)*

-0.89

-0.81

(0.74)

(1.12)

1.11

0.71

(1.09)

(1.86)

Approval (t-1)

0.37
(0.08)**

Constant

53.47
(1.44)**

R2
F
N

.
668.22
96
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; Standard errors in parentheses.

33.15
(4.75)**

0.97
216.60
95
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Table 3: Error Correction Models of Approval
Δ Approval
Approval (t-1)
Δ Inflation
Inflation (t-1)
Δ Unemployment
Unemployment (t-1)
Δ Consumer Confidence
Consumer Confidence (t-1)
Δ Battle Deaths
Battle Deaths (t-1)

With Salience
-0.66

(0.10)**

-0.33

-0.55

(0.12)**

(0.72)

-0.34

0.20

(0.08)**

(0.50)

-0.20

1.38

(0.07)**

(2.46)

-0.18

3.27

(0.07)**

(1.02)**

1.53

0.08

(0.47)**

(0.07)

1.12

0.17

(0.43)**

(0.07)**

-8.29

4.34

(2.88)**

(5.67)

-13.91
0.30
(0.07)**

Security (t-1)
9/11 Attack

Market Crash
Positive Domestic
Positive International
Negative Domestic
Negative International
Constant

(1.74)**

11.84
(4.27)**

0.27

6.16
(4.80)

10.86

7.40
(1.64)**

4.84

2.96

(1.94)**

(1.72)*

-6.31

-6.34

(2.20)**

(2.54)**

3.00

1.59

(1.07)**

(1.13)

2.13

0.89

(1.14)*

(1.05)

-0.93

-0.34

(1.14)

(1.13)

0.79

-0.51

(1.95)

(1.86)

35.82
(6.20)**

R2
F
N

-5.25

(0.10)**
(1.67)**

Iraq Invasion

Without Salience
-0.54

(0.12)**

(2.63)**

Δ Security

Δ Approval

0.52
4.60
95

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; Standard errors in parentheses.

1.08
(7.77)

0.51
4.33
95
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Table 4: Estimated Change in Approval Resulting from A Shift From One Standard
Deviation Below The Mean To One Standard Deviation Above The Mean At Low And
High Salience

Environmental
Variable
Inflation
Unemployment
Consumer
Confidence
Battle Deaths
Security

Level of Salience
10th
90th
percentile
percentile
-1.08
-3.23
-1.08
-5.06
1.90
-0.49
0.48

5.71
-15.80
10.56
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Table 5: Approval Model without Salience
Newey-West
Inflation
Unemployment
Consumer Confidence
Battle Deaths

0.51

0.12

(0.55)

(0.45)

4.26

2.40

(1.16)**

(0.98)**

0.32

0.15

(0.06)**

(0.06)**

-12.51
(1.37)**

Security

24.11
(4.66)**

9/11 Attack

10.76
(3.66)**

Iraq Invasion
Market Crash
Positive Domestic

Negative Domestic
Negative International

-6.37
(1.45)**

10.13
(3.95)**

8.39
(1.56)**

6.69

4.08

(1.87)**

(1.68)**

-6.77

-4.85

(2.24)**

(2.46)*

1.70
(2.19)

Positive International

Lagged
Approval

91
(1.14)*

2.38

1.17

(0.95)**

(1.04)

-0.16

-0.43

(1.69)

(1.16)

-0.66

0.01

(1.24)

(1.85)

Approval (t-1)

0.44
(0.09)**

Constant
R2
F
N
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; Standard errors in parentheses.

7.42

8.20

(9.49)

(7.25)

.
1,051.86
96

0.97
204.91
95
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Figures –

Figure 1: Bush Job Approval By Month

Date
Source: Gallup Poll, monthly data
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Figure 2: Salience of Issues By Month
2001 - 2008

Date
Source: Gallup Poll, monthly data
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Figure 3: Impact of Issues By Month
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APPENDICES –
Table A: Studies of Bush’s Approval Ratings
Study

Time Period

Gelpi, Feaver, and
Reifler (2005/06)

January 2003 to
November 2004
(weekly)

Estimation
Technique

Economic
Variables

Prais-Winsten

Dow Jones
Industrial Average

Events (excludes

a

9/11)
A measure based on
media coverage of
war in Iraq
Dummy variables for:
the onset of each
phase of the Iraq war
capture of Saddam
Hussein
Kay Report release

Eichenberg, Stoll,
and Lebo (2006)

Feb 1 2001 to
January 30 2006
(weekly)

Error Correction
Model

Real disposable
income per capita
(one model)

Complex measure
based on New York
Times coverage

Consumer sentiment
(another model)
Voeten and Brewer
(2006)

April 2003-early
2006 (152 weeks)

Error Correction
Model

Consumer Comfort
Index

Dummy variables for:
Kay Report release
capture of Saddam
Hussein
Abu Ghraib
Election of
transitional national
assembly
Election of full
parliament
Suicide bombings in
March 2004, Aug
2005, and
Feb 2006

Norpoth and Sidman
(2007)

1978-2004 (one set
of analyses)
2001-2004 (another
set of analyses)
(monthly)

2nd order
autoregressive
process (not many
details)

Consumer Sentiment

Iraq war (dummy for
April 2003 with an
estimated decay
parameter)

40

Fox (2009)

2001-2008
(monthly)

Partial Adjustment
Model

Squared difference
between preferred
and actual
unemployment

Iraq War: 3 month
pulse (April, May,
June 2003 = 1, 0
otherwise).

Inflation squared

a

Geys (2010)

1948-2008
(quarterly)

Lagged DV

unemployment,
inflation, real
growth rate of GDP,
war spending

None (other than
9/11)

Fox (2012)

March 2003December 2010
(monthly)

Partial Adjustment
Model (notes Error
Correction Model
and logit model
generated same
basic results)

Squared difference
between preferred
and actual
unemployment

Dummy variables for:

Inflation squared

Studies covering the period of the 9/11 attacks measured the effects of the attack uniquely.

Start of Iraq war
Capture of Saddam
Hussein
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Table B: List of Events by Date and Duration
Number
13
14

Date
Jan-01
Feb-01

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

Apr-01
Nov-02
Sep-03
Sep-03
Dec-03
Apr-04
Nov-04
Feb-05
Sep-05
Nov-05
Nov-06
Feb-07
Jun-07
Mar-08
Nov-08

Number
1
2
3

Date
Sep-01
Mar-03
Sep-08

Ordinary Political Event
Bush Elected President (PD)
US and UK Planes Attack Iraq (PI)
US Spy Plane collides with Chinese Fighter Jet
(PI)
Republicans do well in midterm elections (PD)
No WMDs (PI)
No WMDs (ND)
Saddam captured (PI)
Abu Ghraib (NI)
Bush Re-elected (PD)
Iraqi popular vote (PI)
Hurricane Katrina (ND)
Libby Indicted (ND)
Dems take over Congress in midterms (ND)
Iraq Surge (PI)
Bush Claims Executive Privilege; Libby (ND)
Rescind ban on waterboarding (NI)
Republicans do poorly in general election (ND)
Extraordinary Event
9/11 Terror Attacks
Invasion of Iraq
Stock Market Crash

Duration
1
1
1
4
3
1
2
3
5
3
3
1
4
2
2
3
2
Duration Domain
Security
9
War
6
Economy
4

